Grenfell, Aberfan and the Limits of Piecemeal Process Safety
- William Jones
- 698 reads
At the Hazards 36 conference, Arup's Gill Kernick urged engineers to challenge industry norms and push past piecemeal fixes after Grenfell.

The most useful message from the final day of the Hazards Process Safety Conference in Manchester wasn't about a new technique or a tighter standard. It was a challenge to the people in the room to change how they think about their own assumptions, and it landed hard because of the case study behind it.
A plea for systemic change, not patches
Closing the final plenary, Arup's director of culture and strategy realisation, Gill Kernick, called for "systemic change" after the 2017 fire at Grenfell Tower in West London, which killed 72 people. Her argument was that industry has been adding fixes at the edges rather than examining the structures that produced the failure in the first place.
She acknowledged real progress. The ban on flammable cladding materials, which was the primary technical cause of the fire, is one change. The launch of a new building safety regulator is another. Her point was that these are component-level corrections. "It would be difficult to argue there has been systemic change," she said.
That distinction matters to anyone who works in hazard analysis. A piecemeal fix closes the specific pathway that failed last time. A systemic change asks why the pathway was allowed to exist, who had the authority to close it, and whether the people who raised concerns were in a position to be heard. Kernick's critique was aimed at what she called "cause and effect, command and control thinking," the reflex that follows a major incident and tends to produce a list of corrective actions, a few new procedures and a sense that the problem is handled.
Power, norms and whose voice counts
Kernick pressed the point further. She argued that engineers need to challenge the "power and norms" embedded in their industries, and that includes process safety specialists, who often sit comfortably inside established practice. Her question was whose knowledge gets trusted in an engineering project and whose gets set aside.
She tied this directly to Grenfell. Residents had raised concerns before the fire, and those concerns went unheard. For an audience of people whose job is to anticipate how things fail, the lesson is uncomfortable: a warning can be technically sound and still be ignored because of who delivered it.
Kernick said the fire had "shattered" her trust in organisations to act in the public interest by default. She also said it had made her a better learner, "less willing to assume, and more inclined to challenge and question." That shift from trust-by-default to verification is something practising engineers can apply directly. It means asking who was consulted on a design, whether frontline operators or occupants were ever part of the hazard review, and what happened to the last concern that was raised and then dropped.
Her call to "become troublemakers" is easy to dismiss as rhetoric. In practice it describes a specific habit: being willing to ask an uncomfortable question in a meeting where the schedule and the budget are already set.
Why stories stick when standards don't
Benjamin Dorrian-Clark, a senior consultant in process safety at SLR Consulting, said Kernick's closing line, "Never forget that what you do matters," reinforced why he chose the work. He first wanted to be an engineer without knowing which field to pursue. When he was preparing university applications around the time of the Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2011, he decided he wanted to help stop events like that from happening.
His observation about graduates is worth sitting with. He said many people move into industry without a clear sense of how their work could affect others. Universities teach the technical content well, he said, but the emotional connection to real events is harder to build in a lecture theatre. That gap is exactly what case studies are supposed to fill, and it's why they tend to work better when they're told as stories rather than as a list of root causes.
Dorrian-Clark made a related point about memory. The way engineers retain key process safety information, he said, is through stories, and the tragedies that drive the field will be remembered for years to come. Kernick also referred to Aberfan, whose 60th anniversary was commemorated last month, and Dorrian-Clark noted that both events reinforce the need to think about safety across the full life cycle of a project, from concept through to decommissioning.
What to take back to the office
Chair Eamon Chandler closed the three-day programme by praising the quality of all five plenary speakers and urging attendees to leave with actionable lessons. He singled out Kernick's session, saying it highlighted how much engineers need to know about the people close to a hazard, and how much they need to listen to them.
My read is that Kernick's talk will be the one people remember, not because it offered a new model but because it made the existing ones uncomfortable. The practical takeaway is less about a single standard and more about a set of questions to bring into any review: whose concerns were recorded and whose were closed out, which assumptions in the design have never been tested by someone outside the project team, and what would have to be true for the last near-miss to have changed behaviour. Those questions cost little to ask. Answering them honestly is where the harder work starts.