Sizewell C Cost Overrun Scenario Puts £21.8bn More on Consumers
- Robert Garcia
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A committee warns that Sizewell C’s financing could leave consumers with £21.8bn in extra costs if the project exceeds a stated threshold.

Sizewell C’s financing leaves consumers exposed to a large share of construction cost growth, while private investors’ losses would be capped at £30m under the scenario set out by the Public Accounts Committee. The committee estimates that if total costs rise above £47.7bn, consumers could pay an additional £21.8bn over the plant’s 60-year lifespan; private investors would receive £3.76bn in extra profit. The figures sharpen the central engineering and commercial question for the project: how much protection does a repeat reactor design offer when large nuclear builds have a record of delay and cost growth?
The two planned fission reactors at the existing Sizewell site in Suffolk are currently expected to cost at least £40.5bn. The committee says construction costs are “highly likely” to rise. Its overrun scenario therefore describes a substantial potential exposure for consumers, rather than a confirmed final cost. The committee also warns that consumers could face higher bills while investors bear little risk to their capital, despite expecting a 10% return.
Design repetition meets delivery risk
Sizewell C is planned to use EDF’s European Pressurised Reactor (EPR), a design already used at plants in Finland and France. Developers argue that this experience makes the estimated launch window of 2039–2043 more achievable. Reusing a design can give engineering teams and suppliers a reference point for components, construction methods and sequencing. But a familiar design does not by itself guarantee that site work, procurement and installation will stay on schedule or within budget.
The committee points to EPR projects in Finland and France that were delayed by at least 12 years. It also cites Hinkley Point C, the UK’s other major nuclear project, which has faced multiple delays and budget overruns. These cases matter because schedule slippage and cost escalation can reinforce each other: extended construction means a project must sustain its workforce and site operations for longer, while delays can push back the point when the plant begins generating electricity. The committee’s report does not establish that Sizewell C will repeat those outcomes, but it challenges the assumption that using a proven design will be enough to contain delivery risk.
Sizewell C is planned to generate 3.2 GW, equivalent to around 10% of the UK’s electricity demand over the previous year. That scale makes the project’s delivery and financing important to the energy system, but the headline capacity does not settle the economic case. The terms for sharing construction overruns determine who carries the cost if the engineering schedule or budget proves difficult to maintain.
Who carries the financial exposure?
The financing arrangement was negotiated in poor market conditions, according to the committee. It says there was only “one viable option” for both the reactor design and the site chosen for the next major nuclear project, leaving the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero with little commercial leverage in negotiations with private investors. The UK National Wealth Fund’s equity stake fell from an initial 90% to 45%, while it took on the largest financial exposure through £37bn of the £42bn in debt.
Those figures describe different parts of the financing structure: the fund’s equity share, its lending and the total debt provided. The committee’s concern is that the public side of the arrangement carries substantial risk while private investors’ exposure to losses is limited. It has called for a clearer account of how confidence in the UK nuclear sector can be built so that financial risks in future projects, including small modular reactors, are shared more fairly.
The split matters to project delivery as well as accounting. A cap on investor losses changes how much of an overrun private capital may absorb; the committee argues that the arrangement can leave consumers bearing the consequences through higher bills. The report’s figures do not show what the final cost will be, or how likely each possible outcome is. They do show why the way cost growth is allocated deserves attention alongside the reactor design and planned output.
Competing cases for the project
A spokesperson for the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero rejected the committee’s findings, arguing that investors have an incentive to finish construction as cheaply and quickly as possible. The spokesperson said Sizewell C could save £2bn a year across the energy system once operational, and reported that more than 2,000 workers were already on site. Those are claims about expected system savings and current activity; they do not resolve the committee’s concern about who pays if construction costs exceed the stated threshold.
Tom Greatrex, chief executive of the Nuclear Industry Association, said consumers had paid £2.8bn so far that year to manage a dysfunctional grid, including payments for wind generation to stop at some times and gas-powered backup at others. He argued that more baseload power is needed to limit that escalation, and described repeating a known reactor design as the most cost-effective route. Nigel Cann, chief executive of Sizewell C Ltd, said the project would provide reliable low-carbon electricity and drew on a proven design, a skilled workforce and an experienced supply chain to improve productivity and reduce risk.
The project’s next test is whether those design and workforce advantages can translate into cost and schedule control at a scale that supports the promised output. Sizewell C’s planned 3.2 GW makes successful delivery consequential for the energy system; the financing terms make overruns consequential for consumers. For engineers tracking the build, progress against construction milestones and the handling of cost changes will be key indicators of whether the project’s repeat-design approach is containing risk in practice.